Abstract
The last multilateral negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament took place more than 20 years ago, resulting in the long awaited Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty, however, has yet to enter into force. India is often held responsible for such uncertainty, in spite of having withdrawn from the negotiations before it was even concluded; at other times, it is the US which is blamed for failing to ratify the CTBT—giving reason to many other countries including China, Israel, Egypt and Iran to withhold their own ratification. This paper argues that the reason for the CTBT’s elusiveness is that during negotiations, some key states sought to convert the treaty into more of an instrument of non-proliferation, rather than a first step towards ending the nuclear arms race. In the process, international legal norms were violated. This holds important lessons for the future of arms control and disarmament negotiations.
Introduction
More than 20 years after the United Nations opened the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for signature on 24 September 1996, it has still not entered into force. It is the only multilateral treaty to have met such an uncertain fate. Indeed, the call for a CTBT was made long ago in the early 1950s, as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. The US supported the negotiations when these finally began in 1994, and then President Bill Clinton was the treaty’s first signatory; today, there are 183 countries that have signed up[i] and of these, 164 have ratified the treaty. Yet the CTBT’s entry into force remains an elusive goal. Why has the international community failed to see it through? The reason lies in the history and mechanics of the negotiations of the CTBT between 1995 and 1996, and the brazen attempts by some of the key countries to convert what had been a long-sought disarmament objective into a non-proliferation goal. Even today, the proponents of the CTBT are reluctant to face this uncomfortable reality.
Terminology often needs to be seen in its political context. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, the concepts of ‘disarmament’ and ‘non-proliferation’ were both seen as objectives that are not only desirable, but also to be achieved together. A distinction was established between the two with the coming into existence of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (or the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) in 1968. For decades thereafter, ‘non-proliferation’ became the more urgent and easily achievable objective; and ‘disarmament’ has proved a more difficult goal, needing stronger political will. Thus, efforts to promote disarmament in tandem were often criticised as diversions from the non-proliferation objective, which became priority.
In September, in an effort to consolidate US President Barack Obama’s nuclear legacy, the US introduced, and secured a vote for, a non-binding resolution in the UN Security Council.[ii] The exercise was meant to reinforce global support for the CTBT and the work being done by the verification system set up under the International Monitoring System (consisting of a network of seismic monitoring stations, radionuclide laboratories, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring networks), strengthen the global norm against nuclear testing, and stigmatise those who violate the norm. It also diverts attention from the fact that President Obama has been unable to overcome opposition to the CTBT in the Republican-dominated Senate. The fact that the US Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999 is the primary reason for other countries, notably China, to withhold their own adherence.
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