Asia’s new normal: Making multilateralism work with multipolarity

• SAMIR SARAN
• ASHOK MALIK

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global political and economic architecture has been undergirded largely by one superpower, which set the stage for an unprecedented period of globalisation managed through multilateral institutions and actors. Now that unipolar moment is giving way to an era of diffused powers, with countries like the US, China and Russia each bearing considerable disruptive capacities, and each struggling to stitch together new norms and rules for these rapidly changing times.

This phase, the beginning of which was marked by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and characterised by America’s two bruising wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has seen a vacuum emerge. Many are seeking to fill it, most determinedly China, but with a push back from countries such as Japan and India. Separately, ISIS and radical energies in the Middle East also seek to grab new space. Russia has chosen this very moment to signal its ability to muddy the Eurasian fields and intervene in the Middle East. The fact is, there is not enough room to accommodate all of these ambitions.

A median will have to be arrived at, but who will sacrifice what?

Today’s ‘multi-power’ reality is most visible in Asia and this can be attributed to the lack of a unifying political and security architecture for the Asian region (or regions). The question then arises: Will the Asian century be defined by contestation or cooperation? And how will Asian powers reconcile multipolarity and multilateralism, a process for which there are no handy 20th century templates? The trans-Atlantic political and economic regimes that were the ‘hub’ of the liberal international order has no parallel in Asia. And the single guarantor of good behaviour (certainty and/or predictability) is clearly absent.

The quest for global or regional leadership is the quest for control of common spaces. If in the earlier centuries, territorial borders and maritime frontiers were the crown jewels, today’s common spaces have been rendered seamless by digital arenas and technology that straddles deep oceans and outer-space. What makes the Asian century unique is the differing conceptions of common spaces by major actors. Continental trade regimes and economic integration will sculpt Asia’s future, but these terms are by themselves contested. How can the competing agendas of, for instance, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and One Belt, One Road be reconciled?

On the digital front, is the internet of today the ‘Splinternet‘ of tomorrow? Is cyberspace the new coliseum for digital gladiators? Asian powers and every power engaged with the region is excited by the potential of the digital economy, but many perceive the virtual world through the territorialism of pre-digital politics. Can the internet be a force for collaboration or is it destined to be a contested arena within and between countries, communities and peoples? How can multilateralism sit with this new paradigm where the power of transnational corporations make the equations more complex?

To be sure, the old fault-lines remain active. The Indo-Pacific system is the world’s greatest maritime trading zone, but political ambitions, too, sail across its seas and waters. In the absence of an Asian equivalent to the Monroe Doctrine (sole power dominance in the region), sovereignty is being contested everyday on the high seas. Robust military capacities sustain these conflicts in the Indian Ocean and Pacific littorals. Will the waters of Asia connect and empower, or will they divide and devastate?

Perhaps the most significant policy question for the Asian century is ensuring the realisation of ‘human value’. How will demographic realities in Asia translate into economic, and by extension, political transformations? The region hosts the youngest as well as the most rapidly ageing populations in the world, suggesting that demography can both be a dividend and a disaster. Growth models of decades past are being rendered obsolete by technological advancements and digitisation. These cripple the notion of a demographic dividend. What are the livelihood avenues available to 21st century Asians? Will unemployment continue to fuel the high-octane nationalist and sub-nationalist movements that Asia is witnessing? Does this detract from the ability of Asian actors to ‘sacrifice’ and ‘compromise’, something that multilateralism demands?

Asia needs to think through these pressing questions and so does the world. After all, the Asian century is not exclusive to Asia. It is as much about the rise of Asia, Asian actors and Asian institutions as it is about others who engage with the continent. Challenges and transformations in the region will define not just this continent’s century, but that of the planet.

Asia will shape the 21st century as much as the Atlantic consensus shaped the 20th century, or Europe, the 19th.

Contestation or competition?

In the seven decades since 1945, the US largely succeeded in scripting some significant rules that still survive, and they have guaranteed the stability of global institutions that are the bedrock of contemporary multilateralism. The UN system, the key security treaties, conventions and norms for managing common spaces, all emerged from the conversations of that era. The period since 1990 saw the triumph of the liberal order, and placed the globalisation project firmly within the Atlantic consensus.

The economic imperative to rebuild post-war Europe inevitably necessitated some of these political responses and military instruments. Superpowers became the global guarantors of predictability, whether in trade and commerce or the security domain, and by extension, of multilateralism. This task is now devolving in Asia, but in an Asia that has not been dominated by one sovereign power since the times of Genghis Khan, and an Asia that is stubbornly multipolar.

Asia needs to discover a bridge between multipolarity and multilateralism

This is occurring at a moment when many holdover institutions are flailing, if not failing. The UN resembles not an NGO, as is often suggested, but a think tank. It offers a good platform for talking about norms and rules, but is ill-equipped to enforce any. Inaugurated in 1995, the WTO is in a premature midlife crisis. So where are the new institutions for the Asian century? Where are the important conversations taking place, and among whom? Or, is it time to face up to the harsh truth and accept that rules, actors, institutions, arrangements and ethics that may be able to serve the Asian century are yet to be discovered, born, written and even conceived?

Perhaps, it is time to pursue a new project, one that begins to create a political Asia. Like the Atlantic order needed to flourish on the basis of the Bretton Woods and UN systems, Asia needs a new management, a new board of directors and a new security architecture. At the very least, this system needs to bring three resident actors (China, Japan and India) and two regional stakeholders (the US and Russia) to the same table. Other sub-regional influencers should be drawn in as well.

Continental and Maritime Silk Routes: Prospects for India-China cooperation

This report documents the proceedings of the 1st ORF-RIIO Symposium on India-China Cooperation. The symposium consisted of five sessions and explored the problems and prospects for cooperation between India and China, including the potential in reviving old silk routes and developing new ones.

It focused on key questions, including: What are the key features of the emerging geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)? What is the rationale and intent behind the Maritime Silk Route proposal? What influence will the new connectivity mechanisms have on the geopolitics and geoeconomics of the IOR?

Read the fullreport

US nuclear concerns real, but targets wrong

• N. SATHIYA MOORTHY

Photo: Yves Herman

Anti-proliferation lobbies in the US and elsewhere, especially in South Asia, should be celebrating US President Barack Obama’s call for India and Pakistan to reduce their nuclear arsenal. Their celebrations should stop there, however. Instead, they should all be telling the US where to begin, and what all not to jump.

It’s anybody’s guess why Obama chose to mention India-Pakistan nuclear weapons non-proliferation at a news conference at the end of the two-day Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in the American capital of Washington, DC. Nations do not discuss their n-weapons programme, and their ‘military doctrines’ in public. The US and Russia, the two nations that Obama mentioned as those that had to reduce their n-arsenal, have not done so.

It’s equally unknown, how and why the non-proliferation aides and advisors of the American President did not refer to the post-Pokharan II Indian concerns about China being the (main) nuclear concern. Americans were believed to have been behind the ‘leak’ of then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s confidential missive to President Bill Clinton. Afterward, then Defence Minister George Fernandes acknowledged that China was the ‘potential (nuclear) threat number one’ for India.

In recent years, India would have to add Chinese ‘border incursions’ and ‘border killings’, apart from the unprovoked references to Arunachal Pradesh. India cannot also forget the unchanged Pakistani declaration of ‘Kargil War’ President, Pervez Musharraf, that they would consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons if the Indian troops crossed into (what Islamabad claimed) was Pakistani territory.

Pakistan does not have the ‘Soviet excuse’ anymore, but it would still refer to India. Ask the Chinese, and they could point to Russia, now as then. As the globally-acknowledged ‘emerging super-power’, they cannot keep US from across the Pacific and also from within the Ocean(s), out of their reckoning. Rather, they would not — in public and private, alike. Russia too would point to the USA.

Well, Russia could also refer to the post-Cold War Euro-American play-outs in its immediate neighbourhood, comprising one-time Soviet States. They would not overlook the NATO arsenal on European soil. The bug thus stops there — and the discourse ends in Washington, DC, where Obama has now begun it, all over again. It is also anybody’s guess why Obama, in his news conference, kept China — and American allies with acknowledged or unacknowledged nuclear arsenal of their own — from the reckoning.

Non-State actors

On the other crucial aspect in the Summit context again, Obama might be barking at the wrong tree, all over again. The American concerns about nuclear weapons/material falling into wrong hands cannot be over-stressed. It’s for real, but Pakistan alone should been the target of American concerns and that of the rest of the world, beginning with the Indian and Afghan neighbours of Pakistan, but not ending there.

The US began flagging such concerns only after the Pokharn-II tests, which alone brought the Pakistani nuclear/nuclear weapons capability out of the closet.  Until Pokhran-II provoked Pakistan into enacting Chagai I & II tests, the US went happily not acknowledging what it knew was the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the Indian truth in the matter. A Q Khan, whom India had named for long, suddenly became the bad guy for the US, too. Eliminating A Q Khan’s name and role from contemporary Pakistani nuclear history was convenient, not only for Pakistan but also for America. Afterwards, this is the first time that the US is talking about (Pakistani) nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors – and at such high level as the President’s. It’s in the IS context, welcome, but why Obama should give the impression of equating India and Pakistan in this context, needs some explanation, too. It’s more so, particularly after Prime Minister Narendra Modi had reportedly explained the Indian efforts at security its nuclear weapons and material falling into the hands of non-State actors, at the very Summit.

It has been the undiluted, and at times condescending and contemptuous western attitude that what they are capable of doing on the strategic front, as securing their nuclear weapons developing nations like India are not capable of doing. They need to remember that 9/11 happened against the US, from inside the US and targeting American lives, security and sovereignty, too, so to say. There have been similar attacks in Moscow in the past, and other European capitals, though to a much degree in political terms, in recent months and years. Pakistan is a basket-case for all that can go wrong with a nation-State, and all that has gone with western geo-politics, geo-strategy and geo-economics, all put together.

If Al Qaeda was seen as a haven for fundamentalists and/or mercenaries mostly from Afro-Asian States, IS recruits come from across the world, more so from western nations when compared to the other. Expanding beyond Syria and Iraq, the IS is believed to be competing with Al Qaeda for political, military and territorial space with Al Qaeda, particularly in Afghanistan. Ironically, both were/are creations of the US and the rest of the West, in particular global contexts as they (alone) saw them. Now, they have no control on either of them, or any number of factions that has been typical of conventional Afghan system of warlord-ism.

Compromising sovereignty

It does not stop there, though. By equating India and Pakistan at one-go, and also referring to a need for reduction in nuclear arsenal, that too in public, Obama might have put those two governments in jeopardy, and in more ways than one. Political Opposition and other critics of the governments in these countries could come down heavily on the respective political leaderships for allegedly compromising their sovereignty even before anything has happened.

Any good-faith American initiatives in this respect and other efforts at normalisation of bilateral ties between the South Asian neighbours would be booed down in the two nations. In the heat of the American presidential primaries, Americans would want to know what competing front-runners in public would have to say. It’s more so about the otherwise unpredictable Donald Trump, the Republican favourite, who is still not the favourite of the party bosses.

Trans-Himalayan economic corridor: Nepal as a gateway

• MADHUKAR SJB RANA

Boudhanath Stupa in Nepal

• CONNECTIVITY
• NEPAL

Introduction

Historically, Nepal has prospered, until the advent of the East India Company into the subcontinent, as an economic corridor and a civilizational bridge between adjoining northern India and Tibet. Following the calamitous loss by Nepal in the Anglo Gurkha War of 1814-16, it was territorially reduced in size by around 33 percent and its prevalent national ‘geo-psychology’ was transformed from an emerging Himalayan empire aspiring to be an economic and cultural bridgehead between India and China to simply of a “yam between two boulders.” Subsequently, it sought to look inward and close its doors to the outside world. This paper attempts to examine the idea of a Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor (THEC) centred on Nepal. It is based on the firm belief that a THEC can profoundly transform the entire southeastern Himalayan subregion and the Ganges Basin – where most of the world’s absolute poor and deprived peoples now live – with benefits for all.

The south-eastern Himalayan subregion and the Ganges Basin need a big push in infrastructure investments coupled with far more robust annual economic growth rates to meet the challenges posed by its poverty, mass unemployment and massive underemployment of its human capital. As also, risks arising from natural disasters, climate change, global warming, and not least, water, food, health and energy security threats. Amidst the development and security challenges faced by the Himalayan subregion, the emergence of Asia as a world economic fulcrum, led by China—and a China that is in the throes of its “look west” national strategy offers grand opportunities to deal with these challenges.

The Southern Silk Road (SSR)

The SSR existed historically.[1] It commenced in Yunnan connecting it to Myanmar, India, Nepal and Tibet with a loop back to Yunnan. It is believed that this Silk Road was at its peak in the 13th century with the Mongol Dynasty flourishing; but declined in the 14th century on account of the isolationist policies followed by the Ming Dynasty. It was also called the Tea and Horse Road. However, this has received scant attention. It was, if you like, the predecessor to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC).[2] Yunnan is planned as bridgehead for inter-regional and subregional integration with Myanmar, Bangladesh, eastern India just as China’s Xingjiang is to Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan in reviving the more popular northern Silk Road.

Imagine the prospects, the “One Belt, One Road”[3] or OBOR extended to South Asia by executing the BCIM Corridor and, furthermore, reviving the SSR to connect the Tibetan Plateau to Nepal and extended it into Bihar in northern India and beyond by both road and rail and, even later on by energy grids. It is, indeed a vision of grandeur where all of Asia— North, Central, South, East and West— will be connected by China to Europe and Russia by road and rail. Even so, integration possibilities with Tibet and the Sichuan Province need to be studied and explored for Bhutan, Nepal, North India with and without the extension of the BCIM Economic Corridor with these new destinations.

The BCIM corridor could be extended to Nepal to realize the BBIN vision[4] of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It will also permit India’s Northeast to be connected to another Himalayan corridor through Nepal by land and the potential to have the BCIM countries connected in the near future to the railway network of China with the Lhasa-Kathmandu-Lumbini railway. Such a rail link would make it possible for Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal to trade by land with Pakistan and Afghanistan too.

Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor

Nepal has made it clear that it wishes to act as a Himalayan land-bridge between Central and South and Southeast Asia. Thus it would welcome the ‘southern OBOR’ to be connected with Europe and also welcome the extension of the Chinese Railway into Kathmandu and Lumbini, the birth place of Lord Buddha. Nepal’s King Gyanendra raised the idea of Nepal as a ‘transit economy’ when he proposed this at the Second South-South Summit in Doha in 2005.[5] This strategic policy was well incorporated in the country’s Annual Budget of 2005 with this author, in his capacity as Finance Minister then. Further, the king asked this author to lead a delegation to Lhasa and Beijing to discuss matters about opening more routes on the China-Nepal border for bilateral trade as well as express Nepal’s interest that it would like to see the extension of the Beijing-Lhasa train to the Nepalese border and on to Kathmandu.

Five years later since the idea was first announced, Nepal’s Maoist Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) coined the concept “trilateral strategic relations” involving India, China and Nepal in 2010. He believed that this concept would “address concerns of all three at once”. In 2012, Prachanda, in his capacity as Chairman of Nepal’s Maoist Party, was reported to have signed a $3 billion deal with China-sponsored Asia Pacific Exchange Cooperation (APEC) to develop Lumbini as a world class religious tourism and cultural city.[6]The envisaged project would enormously benefit China, India and Nepal, especially Bodh Gaya, Sarnath and Kushinagar in Bihar. Maoist leader, Babu Ram Bhattarai, while addressing the Parliament on becoming Prime Minister in 2011 stated that, henceforth, Nepal should act as a “friendship bridge”[7] and dispense with the notion that it is a “yam between two stones”.

Arguably, India will prefer Nepal as the Himalayan bridge economy for national security reasons, pending non-settlement of China-India border disputes. Hence, it is of utmost importance for Nepal to take advantage of the Mid-Hill-East-West Highway and link it with Uttarakhand and Sikkim to create a Greater Himalayan Economic Corridor by extending the BCIM Economic Corridor to Bhutan and Nepal. Nepal needs to call for the revival of the SSR as a major new diplomatic thrust with China to establish a Trans Himalayan Economic Belt. It should be underscored here that China has already urged India to join this belt.[8] China foresees the Himalayas as the next frontier for global resource management and conservation particularly in (a) the wake of climate change and global warming and the fact that it serves as the Asian water tower for 4-5 billion peoples and (b) the yet unknown mineral deposits in the Himalayan subregion. Already it is reported that Afghanistan is endowed with $1 trillion of newly found mineral deposits.[9]

It was projected that trade through Sikkim’s Nathula Pass would be $ 48 million by 2007 and will rise to $ 527 million by 2010.[10] As it turns out, not more than $ 5-6 million of border trade actually occurs. This suggests that security and defense politics takes precedence over geo-economics. With such vast potentials, Nepal was quick to declare, in 2005, its interest to serve as a ‘transit economy’, which was eminently possible as per the Treaty of Transit with India. Nepal’s exports to Tibet rose from $ 5.8 million in 1991 to $ 33 million in 2005. A 10 percent of the projected traffic through the Nathula Pass, diverted to Nepal, would be highly significant for Nepal’s balance of trade with both China and India accruing from the transit fees.

It would also provide huge scope for the transit corridor from Birgunj, on the Indian border, to Tatopani on the Chinese border as an opportunity to invest in modern warehouses; container depots; material handling equipment; weighing bridges; inspection and testing laboratories; weighing bridges; repacking logistics centres as well as provide modern living and eating amenities for truckers, agents and freight forwarders. It was planned to also open many more North South Riverine transport corridors to make it possible for traffic in transit directly from West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in northern India.

Three reforms to put railways on fast track

• SANJEEV AHLUWALIA

Courtesy: Smeet Chowdhury/CC BY 2.0

“Indian Railways: Lifeline of the Nation” — runs the bold title of a 2015 government white paper. But the reality is that post-1991 the Indian Railways (IR) has retained its high ritual status, but ceded ground to competition from road transport.

It has only itself to blame. The railways steadfastly stonewalled all attempts to reform its operations. Over the past 15 years, railway operations have been studied by no less than six high-level committees, under Rakesh Mohan (2001), Sam Pitroda (2012), Montek Singh Ahluwalia (2014), Rakesh Mohan (National Transport Development Committee, 2014), D. K. Mittal (2014) and Bibek Debroy (2015). There was no committee chair from the railways.

There are seven executive members of the Railway Board, its highest body, that functions directly under the Railway Minister. There are 9124 senior Group A railway officers who are specialists in finance, commercial services, maintenance, operations, construction and production of rolling stock. It’s odd, therefore, that the government has never trusted these professionals to come up with a vision of what “the lifeline of the nation” should look like. In fact, this illustrates that reform was never an internally driven priority.

Admittedly, with a large workforce of 1.3 million, unionisation in the railways is strong. George Fernandes, former Railway Minister (1989-1990) and Janata Party luminary, sowed his wild oats as a firebrand, railway union leader. But this is exactly why the Narasimha Rao brand of “reform by stealth” cannot work for the Indian Railways. The bottomline is that in such huge industrial enterprises there is no alternative to a broad consensus around reform and approaching it head-on.

The railways languished in the post-reform era as it was unable to build private partnerships and leverage its assets. The government too seemed to have given up on it and turned its attention to building highways instead. So as rail passenger transportation doubled, road passenger transportation has trebled since 1990-91. The railways’ share of freight decreased from 53 per cent in 1986-87 to less than 30 percent today.

The Indian Railways lost ground as it got mired in its own corrosive image of a government entity focused on social objectives — providing cheap, even free, travel. Thus, it lost sight of its mission to become the “economic lifeline” of the nation. Communist China moves less passengers kilometre per kilometre of its rail network than India. But it moves four times more freight kilometer per kilometre of its network than India. The India Railways’ priorities are time-warped around passenger traffic.

The seamless movement of freight over long distances can cut the cost of production and make industry competitive. Long-distance freight is best moved by rail. But the Indian Railways lost the freight business due to a monopolistic tariff policy for bulk freight, such as for coal, iron ore, cement and food grains. It is similar for the power sector. Bulk consumers like industry are still charged at penal rates to cross-subsidise rural and retail consumers.

Railway Minister Suresh Prabhu, like several of his predecessors, is articulate, public-spirited and full of ambitious programmes spelt out in his Railway Budget speech this year. On offer is more public investment to remove the choke points which congest and slow down traffic; a more extensive search for alternative revenues from station redevelopment and the monetisation of assets; better passenger facilities and continued implementation of the dedicated freight corridors.

But clarity on the Indian Railways’ core mission is missing, that has to be, first and foremost, the movement of freight and increasing the railways’ marketshare in the city and suburban passenger traffic.

Three reform measures are preconditions for success:

• First, it is SMART to switch intra-city and suburban passenger traffic to rail from road. The savings on travel time and the avoided cost of air pollution justify such investments. But this is an option only if we can make these systems attractive for private investment and management. Assured viability gap funding on the back of regular adjustment of tariff is a must. The experience of “independent” regulators in electricity shows that in large metros, with high income levels, cost-reflective tariffs can work, if customers can transparently see for themselves the value proposition the service offers.

Bring Myanmar also into BBIN grouping

Photolabs@ORF

2016

Apr

05

A former senior Indian diplomat has suggested including Myanmar also in the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) grouping.

Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, Distinguished Fellow at ORF and a former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, felt the BBIN grouping has elements of becoming a very successful sub-regional organization and so we have to nurture it and prevent political calculations from hijacking the larger developmental and economic objectives.

Chakravarty was delivering the valedictory address at the consultative international workshop on ‘Proximity to Connectivity: India and her Himalayan Neighbours’ organised by ORF in Kolkata on March 29-30.

He drew attention to the fact that despite the region’s inherent commonalities, the intra-regional trade is very low which indicates a much deeper problem of politics trumping economics. He said that technology has made remarkable progress but politics still continues to obstruct efforts. In this context, he highlighted the importance of grid connectivity, infrastructural developments and cooperation in the field of cyberspace.

However, Bhutan, despite its optimism on the grouping and its agreement on motor vehicles (BBIN MVA, signed last year), seems to be treading carefully. The Consul General of Bhutan, Dasho Karma Tshering Namgyal, also cautioned that the MVA could even aggravate cross border terrorism.

The official said “something that looks glamorous in the beginning may turn out uglier in the end.” He also pointed out that while the Agreement could be advantageous to some, it might not turn out to be so for every country.

He said the best way to stay friendly was through understanding the geo-political scenario of one’s own country as also that of the neighbours. Talking about connectivity he highlighted the significance of hydroelectricity which is referred to as Bhutan’s ‘white gold’.  He reiterated the fact that hydroelectricity has already given Bhutan a very good platform to enhance its bilateral ties with India.

Sita Basnet, the Consul General of Nepal in Kolkata, highlighted that their effort towards connectivity is linked with the optimal use of resources and their just distribution. This will inevitably lead to a consolidation of the voice of the people. She mentioned the importance of the BBIN MVA but advised against premature euphoria since there remains a long way to go. She said that the there should be a collective dream for moving towards the goal of an integrated and inter-linked region.

Prof. Lokraj Baral, the Executive Chairman of Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies (NCCS) and a former ambassador, delivering keynote address, considered that there could be no connectivity without meeting of minds. South Asia, in his opinion, is already well connected. Highlighting the interconnectedness of India and Nepal, he cited few instances as evidence to support his argument. For example, Nepal’s education system draws upon Macaulay’s idea of education in India that was promulgated in the nineteenth century. Most of the Nepalese leaders have been educated in India. The recruitment of Gorkhas in the Indian Army also closely linked  India and Nepal. There has been physical connectivity as well in terms of road and air linkages between the two countries. Yet, Amb. Baral argued the problem lay essentially in the management of roads and other such logistics. It takes a long time to organize meetings between the two countries and numerous projects including hydropower projects are in a limbo. While Modi’s visit to Kathmandu last year led to the decision to reactivate the projects, they need to be expedited.

The first business session focused on “Cross-border Trade, Transit and Connectivity (rail, road, air and energy)”. It was observed that India agreeing to open the Vishakhapatnam port to Nepal for third country trade besides the already existing Kolkata/ Haldia port was a step forward in India’s connectivity with Nepal.The need for relooking at fundamentals when it comes to connectivity between Nepal and India was stressed. South-South Cooperation could present a model for bringing forth connectivity in the region but countries should decide how they want to look at their boundaries – as frontiers or as borders. Leveraging technology for connectivity could be a stepping stone in toning up connectivity in the region.

It is evident that Bhutan is weighing the merits of BBIN MVA signed in June, last year. While Bhutan has a strong political motivation to go ahead with it, the Himalayan nation feels that certain problems need to be addressed. Environmental and security issues topped Thimphu’s list of concerns. In this regard there is a need for addressing the impact of development, especially when Bhutan faces a development dilemma. Despite Bhutan having a different development model, there was a commonality in development thinking within the BBIN countries. The possibilities of establishing a Regional Stock Exchange, a Commodity Exchange and a Currency Union as the way forward for taking forward sub-regional cooperation were also discussed.

The second business session explored the “Scope for Strengthening Cooperation in Tourism, Education and Culture”. Along with major cultures like Hinduism, Buddhism, it was felt that ethnic cultures should be given prominence by both the countries. India is organising exchange programmes with Nepal and Bhutan but there is room for greater engagement. The education system in Bhutan has been divided into monastic education, general education and non-formal education. Since India provides monastic education, Nalanda University can collaborate with respective centres in Bhutan. India also provides training to Bhutanese army and police. India can contribute to strengthening Bhutan’s eco-tourism sector as the latter lacks proper infrastructural facilities like internet coverage. India already offers scholarship to Bhutanese students; Indian teachers teach at Bhutanese schools and colleges. With respect to connectivity, the issue of geo-politics is extremely important along with geo-economics. Bhutan, Nepal and India must remember that trust deficit leads to weak inter-state cooperation and make conscious efforts to remain convivial towards each other.

The theme of the final business session was “India and her Himalayan Neighbours within a Changing Asia”. The concept of sub-regionalism is a relative one as it is always a sub-set of and pitched against the concept of broad adjoining regions. It is undeniable that the state has its own imperatives such as sovereignty concerns, equitable distribution and so on while coping with the forces of globalization and ever evolving market conditions. The pertinent question therefore is how people feature in all these dimensions. Politics is essentially territorial with strategic concerns and from this perspective while the movement of people is a welcome proposition across states, concerns regarding the negative implications such as the movement of terrorists need careful consideration. While Nepal is striving to come out of its decade long transition to establish a lasting order, it must be kept in mind that foreign policy of the country will remain unstable for a few years to come as it is a natural feature of a new democracy and competitive political system.

China calibrates its strategic options with Nepal through the larger lens of its existing strategic matrix with India. China has been furthering its linkages with Nepal through the instruments of infrastructure, tourism, hydroelectricity, and cultural exchanges. While the blockade issue has taken its toll on India-Nepal relations, points of convergence need to rediscovered and carefully nurtured by both countries.

Analysing Ufa Declaration

• SHUBH SONI

The sharpest and the most explicit critique of the US in Ufa Delcaration is its failure to ratify the IMF 2010 reform package. The second major criticism is over the on-going furore over governance of the internet. The BRICS countries see the ICT sector as a critical platform they can leverage in their transition from emerging to developed economies.

The Russian presidency of the BRICS concluded with the Ufa declaration on the 9th of July, 2015. The declaration reaffirmed the BRICS stance on three issues – first, the need for the five countries to strengthen their economic cooperation; second, to keep in check the influence of the United States in geo-politics and geo-economics; and third, increasing the role played by the UN in world affairs.

Increased economic cooperation

The theme of the seventh BRICS summit was “BRICS Partnership- a Powerful Factor of Global Development”. The declaration thus begins by formally marking the entry of the newly- established New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement. Building on this, the strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership was adopted on the 9th of July which will provide the guiding principles for increased economic cooperation amongst member countries in the following areas-trade and investment; manufacturing and minerals processing; energy; agricultural; science, technology and innovation; financial cooperation; connectivity and ICT cooperation. In order to make this process a success, five critical tools were identified- (i) expanding the use of respective national currencies in transactions amongst BRICS; (ii) a Framework for BRICS E-Commerce Cooperation to promote current and future initiatives; (iii) Initiative on Strengthening IPR Cooperation amongst members; (iv) the establishment of an annual BRICS Expert Credit Agencies (ECAs) meet to promote exports among BRICS and to other nations; and (v) establishing a BRICS working group on ICT cooperation.

The BRICS members have also backed the ambitious targets of the post-2015 development agenda and stated that the commitment to eradicate poverty should be adhered to by all countries. However, as an Overseas Development Report points out, there is an annual $73 billion funding gap to meet health, education and social security targets, specified in the post-2015 agenda. The declaration makes clear the displeasure of the emerging economies and asks the developed world to honour its commitments towards Official Development Assistance. In this context, the role of South-South cooperation too has been emphasised to complement the efforts of North-South cooperation i.e. the members see collaboration amongst Developing & Emerging Economies (such as the NDB and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) as a tool to supplement the efforts of existing global structures.

Critique of U.S. policy

The sharpest and the most explicit critique of the United States is its failure to ratify the IMF 2010 reform package. The BRICS members, along with a host of other developing and emerging economies, have demanded that voting rights at the Bretton Woods Institutions be more representative of the new world order in which the developing countries play a significant role i.e. global governance through multilateral bodies need to be democratized. The U.S Congress has thus far not paid heed to these demands, much to the frustration of the Global South, particularly the BRICS.

The second major criticism is over the on-going furore over governance of the internet. As highlighted earlier, the BRICS countries see the ICT sector as a critical platform they can leverage in their transition from emerging to developed economies. However, they have expressed their condemnation of mass electronic surveillance and data collection and called for the U.N. to play a critical role on the issue of internet security. On the broader issue of internet governance, there is no mention of the role of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) or International Telecommunication Union (ITU), suggesting the grouping is yet to come to a consensus on the issue.